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Abstract 
This study aims to analyze how Grupo Soares da Costa, a diversified group centered on 
construction, behaved in terms of strategy to the current crisis. More specifically, it 
purposes to understand why Soares da Costa was forced to abandon its strategic plan 
“Ambições Renovadas”, which was about diversification and internationalization, to 
decide to focus on it core business.  
This study uses a SWOT analysis, the examination of the strategic plans and annual 
reports and the conclusions of two interviews that were carried out.  
Being the construction sector such a traditional and significant sector to the Portuguese 
economy, it is important to understand what a company can do to overcome such 
circumstances. To deal with all the negative circumstances, Soares da Costa should give 
priority to projects that require low levels of initial capital and diversify geographically 
to markets with similar characteristics of Angola and Mozambique, where Soares da 
Costa already excels.  
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Introduction 
In the Strategic Plan presented on September 15 of 2010, the response of Soares 
da Costa (SdC), a diversified group centered on construction, to the poor prospects in 
the construction domestic market was to diversify to the energy and environment 
sectors (Soares da Costa, 2010a). However, by November 28 of 2011 an update to the 
plan stated that SdC would no longer invest in other areas and would focus on its core 
business (Soares da Costa, 2011). This study analyzes the case of SdC in order to 
understand how it is reacting in terms of strategy to the economic crisis in Portugal. The 
reasoning of making a strategic plan based on diversification and internationalization 
made sense, however the financial situation of SdC combined with the worsening of 
economic conditions in Portugal made it impossible to follow. Now, SdC should rely on 
projects with low capital requirements in countries with similar characteristics of 
Angola and Mozambique. 
Most of literature regarding this subject - firms adapting to changes in economic 
context - is about technological innovation and new business areas. This study analyses 
a company having a traditional sector as the core business, which is neither a high-
technology, nor a typical innovative sector. It is, however, a fundamental sector to the 
Portuguese economy, representing about 12% of GDP (GPEARI, 2011).  
The work is divided in eight main parts: the literature review, the context of 
global crisis in Portugal and in the construction sector, the characterization of SdC, how 
the crisis affected the group, the analysis of the strategic plans, then the analysis of the 
risks taken by SdC, the recommendations and the main conclusions.  
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Leading	  trough	  hard	  times,	  Intrapreneurship	  for	  overcoming	  crisis	  
According to Pinchot (1978), intrapreneurs are “those who take hands-on 
responsibility for creating innovation of any kind within an organization.” Firms should 
encourage their ‘intrapreneurs’ in order to develop new markets and products. However, 
diversifying could be a hard task and the right timing is everything. This work deals 
with these both strands: the idea of diversifying to the energy sector and then the 
realization that the best thing to do is to continue focusing on construction, the core 
business.  
According to El Namaki, there are four patterns of strategic behavior under 
turbulence: Seeking Concentration, Seeking Competencies, Seeking Focus and Seeking 
End Game (El Namaki, 2013). When SdC bought Self Energy in 2010 and reinforced its 
position in the international markets, the strategic behavior followed was the Seeking 
Competences, more specifically a Competency Acquisition Strategy, as it reflects the 
beginning of doing business in different areas. However, with the reversal the strategy 
behavior followed was the Seeking Focus, which confines the scope of the company’s 
competencies to a core aptitude – “narrowing the scope of company competencies and 
the actual confinement to a core” (El Namaki, 2013). 
Analyzing the destiny one decade later of the Fortune 500 Companies of 1994, 
153 of those companies had either gone bankrupt or acquired and 130 had made a 
decisive change in their core business strategy. However, only half of these companies 
succeeded in their strategy. According to Zook, the general path of a company can be 
described as a focus-expand-redefine cycle: a company starts well on focusing on what 
it outdoes, and then expands its core in order to grow (Zook, 2007). The issue is that 
this cycle has been accelerating more and more. Currently, companies face more and 
faster change than ever before, due to innovations, globalization or to periods of 
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economic uncertainty, so they must act in order to prosper. However, caution is 
imperative as Zook warns, several companies precipitately leave their core business “in 
the pursuit of some hot market or sexy new idea” to then realize the mistake it was. Not 
every company that finds itself in hard times has to rethink its whole strategy.  
Changing the core business is not synonymous of having success. This study aims to 
analyze why SdC tried to diversify to other sectors, like energy, and then had to refocus 
on the core business again. 
 
Global Crisis, Portugal and the construction sector 
In 2011, Portugal begun the implementation of the EU-IMF financial assistance 
program to enhance growth and control the excessive debt, as the global crisis brought 
to the surface weaknesses and imbalances in the Portuguese economy (OECD, 2012). In 
2009 the GDP fell by 2.6%, which meant a severe breaking, notwithstanding not as 
severe as in the euro area as a whole, due to the low exposure to toxic assets and the 
inexistence of a real estate bubble in Portugal (OECD, 2010). Portugal felt the tough 
consequences of the global crisis in 2009 and 2010, with the debt rate being 
downgraded, the sovereign debt crisis and the correspondent spreads increasing, which 
translated into hard periods in being able to finance the economy, mainly due to the lack 
of confidence from the investors. Two of the consequences were the decreasing of GDP 
(table A1, appendix) largely due to the contraction of domestic demand (INE, 2012) and 
the increase of the public debt from 68,4% of the GDP (2007) to 94% (2010) (Figure 
A1, appendix). The unemployment rate also amplified substantially (table A2) with 
values of 7.9% in 2007, 10.6% and 16.4% in 2010 and 2013 respectively.  
The construction sector includes the construction and renovation of buildings, 
residential and no residential, and public works. It is affected by several unique distinct 
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factors: the weather conditions, the bank interest rate to finance the activity and the 
legal requirements to obtain licenses and certifications. Furthermore, the activity is 
subject to great instability concerning the periodicity and is also a nomad activity, as all 
the necessary resources have to be reallocated in the new construction site (Morais, 
2010). The construction sector serves as barometer of the Portuguese economic activity, 
since it is immediately affected as the economic context changes: during times of 
economic prosperity the government invests substantially more in this sector, by 
increasing public works contracts, than in times of economic trouble. The same 
declining trend exists for private demand in the housing market. All in all, it is a vital 
sector for the economy mobilizing large resources and driving many other activities.  
The construction sector in Portugal was one of the most affected by the global 
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, mainly due to the high level of saturation concerning 
the housing and office markets (Fernandes, 2011), to the credit crunch and to a 
continuous fall in the confidence level of the economic agents (table A3). The main 
factors have been constraining the construction activity, according to the sector, are 
exhibited in table 1. The factor with the largest variation is ‘Difficulty in obtaining bank 
credit’, with values of 9,25% in 2007 and 54,46% in 2013. In 2013 the credit granted to 
construction companies was inferior to 19 billion euros, the lowest value since 2004 
(FEPICOP, 2013). At the beginning of the crisis banks appeared to be dealing with the 
global crisis relatively well. However, from 2010 onwards, Portuguese banks have been 
affected by the crisis due to the excessive reliance on foreign borrowing and excessive 
exposure to government bonds. Banks were forced to rely on the Eurosystem financing, 
as the access to debt market got difficult (OECD, 2012). The outcome was the 
contraction in the credit supply.  
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The crisis in the construction sharply affected the labor market. Employment on 
the construction sector had a steeper decrease than in total employment (table 2). 
All in all, in 2010, which was the year that the crisis consequences really hit 
Portugal, the output of the sector decreased by 8,5% affecting the cement sales in -7% 
comparing to 2009 values (Soares da Costa, 2010b). 
The Soares da Costa Group  
Soares da Costa: from family firm to business group 
 The business group has its origins the early twentieth century, when José Soares 
da Costa founded SdC in 1918 (see table A4, for the group’s evolution). During the 
1940s and the 1950s the family firm was consolidated in Porto and during the 1960s it 
expanded to Lisbon, Algarve, Madeira and Azores. Throughout the 1970s, SdC entered 
the social housing construction segment and the internationalization process began in 
the 1980s to Venezuela, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Diversification to engineering, 
public works, concessions of infrastructures and real estate businesses marked the 
1990s. In 2002 the business group was created, with the establishment of the holding 
Grupo Soares da Costa SGPS, S.A. and four sub-holdings corresponding to the strategic 
business areas at the time (Construction, Industry, Concession and Real Estate). In the 
same year, the founding family sold its stake to Investifino – investment management 
society (holding) of Manuel Fino - that became the major shareholder. The group’s 
organizational structure can be seen in figure A2. 
 The year of 2008 was marked by acquisitions: the Portuguese construction 
company Contacto and the North American Prince. In 2010 the group acquired a 
majority stake in Self Energy and in 2011 the first work in Brazil took place (Soares da 
Costa, 2013a).  
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The group and the construction sector 
In terms of net results, the Portuguese largest construction companies are: 
Estradas de Portugal, a public company, Teixeira Duarte, Mota-Engil, Sociedade de 
Construções Soares da Costa and Zagope (Albuquerque, Silva, Simões, Carvalho, & 
Pereira, 2012). Throughout this report, for comparison and benchmarking purposes, 
SdC will be compared with Teixeira Duarte Group and Mota-Engil. They represent the 
three largest private construction companies in Portugal. 
In terms of rivalry, the construction sector is characterized by no relevant market 
shares and by fragmentation. It is a decentralized market, with many diversified 
operators, as the sum of the market shares of the six largest companies in the market as 
of October of 2010 – MotaEngil, Somague, Teixeira Duarte, SdC, Opway and Edifer – 
was between 20% and 30% (Autoridade da Concorrência, 2012). A new investment 
fund, Vallis Construction Sector Consolidation Fund, was created with the aim of 
controlling distressed medium sized companies of the Portuguese Engineering and 
Construction sector. According to Pedro Gonçalves, current fund manager and former 
CEO of SdC, this new company will have about the same size, in terms of business 
volume, of SdC (Pinheiro, 2012). Vallis Capital Partners is a holding company, whose 
share capital is 100% owned by its Founding Partners. The companies acquired by the 
fund since May 2013 (Edifer, Hagen, MonteAdriano and Eusébios) embraced a new 
commercial brand known as Elevo Group (Vallis Capital Partners, 2013). According to 
António Castro Henriques (current CEO of SdC) this fund does not represent a threat in 
terms of competition in Portugal, however it does in Angola (Fonseca, 2013a). In 
conclusion, it seems that due to the difficult conditions that the sector is experiencing, a 
concentration movement in the sector starts to emerge. 
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In 2013, SdC occupied the 108º place as the Largest International Contractor 
and the 205º place as the Largest Global Contractor according to Engineering News-
Record. SdC group has four business areas: Construction, Concessions, Real Estate and 
Energy Services (figure A3). With a turnover of 800 million Euros in 2012, SdC has 
4500 workers in the group’s different subsidiaries (Soares da Costa, 2013a). 
From 2007 to 2012, SdC turnover increased 46% and the EBITDA grew 99%. 
In 2012, 78% of its turnover was in the construction business, 19.5% in the concessions 
and 2.3% in real estate (Soares da Costa, 2013a)  (figure A4 for more details). 
Due to the present economic conditions in Portugal and the appealing conditions 
of some countries, more than 70% of the turnover currently comes from abroad. 
Internationally, SdC bets on high potential markets, namely Angola, Mozambique, USA 
and Brazil. In 2012, 44% of the turnover came from Angola, 29% from Portugal, 16% 
from USA and 8% from Mozambique. The remaining 3% are relative to other markets 
such as São Tomé e Principe and Romania. From 2007 to 2012, the international 
activity increased by approximately 52% (figure A5). 
 
 Changes in ownership and control 
In 2013, the group’s shareholder structure is divided in three parts: 71% of the 
capital belongs to Investifino (Manuel Fino’s holding, 11% to Parinama and 18% are 
free float (figure A6). On 23 September 2013, economic newspapers announced the 
entry of the Angolan entrepreneur António Mosquito in Soares da Costa Construção, 
which meant the beginning of the recapitalization process of 70 million euros paid by 
GAM Holdings, controlling 66,7% of SdC construction sub-holding: SCC Construção 
SGPS. The agreement states that António Mosquito will choose five members of the 
administration board, while Manuel Fino will appoint the remaining two (Noronha, 
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2013). Although António Mosquito will control 66,7% of SdC construction capital, 
Manuel Fino imposed some rules that Mosquito will have to comply with: impossibility 
of relocation of the headquarters and a corporate change in the shareholder structure of 
the company. Furthermore, António Mosquito is also prevented from making decisions 
concerning increases or decreases of capital, fusions and dissolution, among others. 
Another important part of the agreement states that António Mosquito would not be 
responsible for the North American subsidiary, Prince (Silva, 2013).  
According to António Castro Henriques the news are in general true, although 
poorly explained. The Angolan Investor, will enter in the group sub-holding named 
‘SCC Construção SGPS’ (Fonseca, 2013a). Therefore, when the article says that 
Manuel Fino will still control the company decisions is in the sense that Manuel Fino 
controls 71% of the group holding: ‘Grupo Soares da Costa SGPS SA’. However, 
António Mosquito will have the decision power regarding the construction sub-holding. 
Manuel Fino is no longer the president, however António Castro Henriques remains as 
CEO - for a better understanding of the changes in SdC’s structure, see figure A7. 
The Group SdC is now divided into two parts: the construction sub-holding, 
having António Mosquito as the major shareholder and the holding itself that represents 
the group. In terms of strategy, the entry of António Mosquito will change the fact that 
SdC Construções is no longer interested in reducing de dependence from the Angolan 
market, contrarily to what was said in the Strategic Plan “Ambições Renovadas 2014”. 
Another change affects the department “Serviços Partilhados” – department that 
provides services to all the remaining departments of the group - that was transferred 
from the holding to the construction sub-holding, contrary to what happened with 
Prince. According to Castro Henriques, this is natural, as the Angolan investor did not 
want to be dependent on the Group, which he does not control, regarding these services. 
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Furthermore, according to the 2013 report, the recapitalization enabled the restructuring 
of debt with some banks, related to the construction business, making it possible to 
maintain over 4000 jobs in Portugal and abroad(Soares da Costa, 2013b).  
All in all, when the article says that Manuel Fino will still have control, is 
regarding the holding company. He will loose the decision power concerning the 
construction sub-holding, notwithstanding the restraining clauses on Mosquito’s 
initiatives mentioned above. The bottom line is that SdC group remains the principal 
management entity concerning two main activities – concessions and real estate – and 
an active participant in the construction business in partnership with GAM. In this way 
the group no longer controls the construction business area (Soares da Costa, 2013b).  
Soares da Costa Group and the crisis  
The crisis in the construction sector in Portugal began before the global crisis, as 
the sector cannot yield a positive growth since 2001, mainly due to the excess of 
residential construction, which was aggravated after 2008.  
Taking into account that 89,5% of SdC’s turnover in 2010 came from the 
construction business (Soares da Costa, 2010b), it becomes clear that the group suffered 
with the crisis and had to adapt its business strategy. It suffered particularly due to the 
slowdown in the public investment along with the measures of fiscal contraction that 
lead to a decrease in domestic demand and to an increase of the leverage, followed by 
the credit squeeze. Concerning public investment, the analysis of ‘Public Works 




	   12	  
SWOT Analysis  
SdC has to face all the challenges of having its business focused on the 
construction industry. The difficult conditions and prospects of the sector represent the 
major challenges of having construction has the core business in Portugal, namely the 
large impact in the group’s profitability (table A5). The SWOT analysis was made 
based on the values of 2010 to see if “Ambições Renovadas 2014” plan made sense, as 
2010 was the year in which the plan was created. 
The market conditions obliged SdC to increase the level of debt, with the 
deterioration of the net debt to EBITDA ratio (table 4). Although the ratio decreased 
until 2008, the ratio always increased afterwards. Teixeira Duarte is the firm presenting 
the worst ratio in 2010 (9.18), but closely followed by SdC (8.66). 
 The main challenges faced by SdC around 2010 were:  
• Weak prospects regarding the domestic market in terms of credit contraction, 
deceleration of the construction market and lower public and private investment; 
• Too much dependence on the Angolan market: 34,64% of the turnover in 2009 and 
38,60% in 2010 (Soares da Costa, 2010b); 
• Too much dependence on the construction business: the turnover regarding the 
construction sector was 89% of the total, while the average of the largest Iberian 
construction groups was 61% (figure A8); 
• Pressure to decrease the level of indebtedness - net debt/EBITDA of 7.5 in 2009 
(figure A9); 
 The main consequences and challenges of SdC were highlighted previously and 
now the part of the SWOT analysis regarding the weaknesses and threats is addressed:  
Weaknesses (internal factors) Threats (external factors) 
• Too much dependence on the 
Angolan market; 
• Poor prospects for the domestic market; 
• Contraction of the public and private 
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• Too much dependence on the 
construction business; 
• High level of indebtedness; 
investment; 
• Increase of spreads for the same level of 
risk; 
• Credit shortage; 
Concerning the positive side of the SWOT analysis for 2010, the major strength 
of SdC, according to Castro Henriques, was its appreciable international profile: 
Strengths (internal factors) Opportunities (external factors) 
• Positive growth regarding both the turnover 
(from 2008 to 2009 from 853 to 936 million 
euros) and EBITDA (between 2008 and 2009 
a growth of 4.44%); 
• High level of internationalization – 57% of 
the turnover in 2010; 
• Geographical diversification. 
• African and Latin American 
markets with good prospects 
in the construction segment; 
• USA with good prospects 
concerning the renewable 
energies market;  
Designing a strategy to the group   
In 2007 the plan in force was “Ambição Sustentável 2007-2012”. From 2004 
until 2007, the construction sector had performed better relatively to the overall market 
and the Iberian construction companies had higher appreciation than the sector (Soares 
da Costa, 2007). By 2006, 61.8% of SdC revenue came already from the international 
markets, 42.9% for Teixeira Duarte and 32.7% for Mota-Engil (Soares da Costa, 2007). 
In 2006 the construction Portuguese market had already the worst performance in 
Europe, with recession in all segments (civil engineering, residential and non 
residential). Regarding the non-European countries, Angola and the United States were 
the ones attracting SdC, according to the plan. Thus, the strategic vision enhanced in 
this plan was to continue the diversification path, investing mainly in the concession 
business, and eliminating industry and real estate areas that were no longer strategic 
priorities. 
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Meanwhile, the profile of SdC and the construction market had changed 
significantly. On September 15th 2010, SdC presented a new Strategic Plan called 
“Ambições Renovadas 2014”. Pedro Gonçalves, CEO of SdC at the time, described the 
plan as being an anticipation to the consequences of the crisis in construction sector and 
a way to react to the change in SdC profile: increasing investments in transports 
concessions, internationalization and market diversification (Soares da Costa, 2010b). 
Additionally, SdC recorded significant growth in terms of both turnover and 
profitability between 2007 and 2009, almost reaching the mark for 2010 (table A6).  
The return on capital employed also improved between 2007 and 2009 (table A7) 
almost reaching 5% in 2009, when the target was at 5.5% for 2010. All in all, the 
objectives of the former strategic plan became less challenging and should be revised.  
Internationalization  
 Concerning the internationalization side the objectives planned were: 
• Enter into the Brazilian construction market to reduce the dependence on the 
Angolan market and to benefit from the good prospects that the Brazilian market 
presented – according to the plan it should represent 25% of the consolidated 
EBITDA in 2014; 
• Open the capital of the Angolan subsidiary to reduce both the exposure to that 
market and the associated operational risk; 
• Expand the business in the United States in infrastructures and renewable energies; 
• Search for business opportunities in Latin America and other African countries. 
Diversification: Energy 
Concerning the sectorial diversification, SdC planned to enter in the renewable 
energy sector. To do so, in 2010 SdC Group acquired a majority position in Self Energy 
	   15	  
(Soares da Costa, 2010b). “Self Energy is the first Portuguese ESCO (Energy Service 
Company) that provides an overall service management of energy, to reduce costs and 
energy consumption, with guaranteed return on investment associated with the 
performance of the energy service provided” (Soares da Costa, 2013c). Paulo Jorge dos 
Santos Pinto Leal is the President and the company has 46 employees.  
 The decision behind the choice of the Energy sector was because of the highly 
attractive historical profitability margins and the good growth prospects justified the 
choice of the energy sector (figure A10 and A11). 
  Growth in this new market would be achieved by gaining specific skills through 
partnerships and acquiring small companies in the sector. The growth would be mostly 
organic, gradual and progressive, and the estimated investment 2010-2014 was planned 
to be between 20-30 million euros excluding acquisitions. The markets chosen to invest 
were Europe, Africa, United States and Brazil. The activities to develop were, among 
others: exploitation of small hydro power stations, delivering energy management 
services, and installation of power units, mainly solar energy. The target for the sector 
was to reach 19% of the consolidated EBITDA in 2014 (Soares da Costa, 2011). 
 The hydro power is fully commercial and is also a well-established technology. 
Furthermore, this source of energy is very flexible, as it can be used to deliver base-load 
power as well as to meet peak demand or can even be used as a storage system (Brown, 
Muller, & Dobrotková, 2011). It is important to keep in mind that the production 
quantities are dependent on the rainfall levels. Nevertheless, due to its inherent 
advantages the hydro power is the “dominant source of renewable energy worldwide”, 
representing 16.2% of global electricity production in 2009 (Brown et al., 2011). Since 
1990, hydropower has grown by 50%, though it seemed a good technology to be 
considered by a group like SdC that aims to diversify its business even more.  
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 SdC also considered investing in the installation of solar thermal power units. In 
the past years this segment had high growth rates (Brown et al., 2011). Taking into 
consideration that sunny climates benefit more from this technology, Portugal, Brazil, 
African countries and the United States seemed suitable countries to invest in this area. 
 Regarding Portugal, the renewable energies represent 45% of the total electricity 
produced and 38% of the electricity consumed. Portugal has favorable weather 
conditions to the production of energy based in renewable sources, especially when it 
concerns the hydric, wind and solar energies. To get an idea, the sector had contributed 
directly in 2008 with nearly 2400 jobs and it is expected that in 2015 the number of jobs 
will be approximately 5800, which represents a growth between 2008 and 2015 of 
140% (Deloitte, 2009). 
The volte-face – why? 
“Ambições Renovadas 2014” was created to face the changes in SdC profile as 
well as to improve the profitability and return of the shareholders, through geographic 
(internationalization) and sectorial diversification, due to the decrease of the domestic 
construction segment from 2009 to 2010 (-25,4%), which was not compensated at all by 
the increase of the foreign markets (4,9%) (table 5). 
According to Castro Henriques, when public investment is growing, companies 
take many risks, increasing financial leverage. To finance this strategic plan and to 
reduce the level of indebtedness – one of the objectives of the plan, SdC foresaw the 
sale of some non-core assets. The divestments would total 150 to 170 million euros. 
In 2010, when the consequences of the crisis started to show up, SdC should 
have been more conservative and able to predict what was to come, not implementing 
an ambitious plan like “Ambições Renovadas 2014”, specially knowing the leverage 
that would be implied in this plan. However, the truth is that in 2010, looking at the 
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situation of SdC (SWOT analysis), a diversification process seemed to be a reasonable 
idea to reduce the dependence on the construction business. The main problem of the 
plan was the increase in the indebtedness level. 
On 28 November 2011, SdC announced an update to the strategic plan 
“Ambições Renovadas 2014” due to the worsening of the sectorial and economic 
conditions as well as the poor credit availability. The new strategic guidelines were 
oriented to: internationalization, construction sector and financial sustainability (Soares 
da Costa, 2011). Some plans would be maintained, namely regarding the investment in 
the African countries, Brazil and USA. However, the update to the strategic plan 
proposes to postpone the investment in the energy sector. According to António Castro 
Henriques, the poor economic conditions in Portugal were in fact the ultimate reason for 
postponing the investment, as well as the insufficient capital that threatened not only the 
expansion prospects but also the on going projects. It became very clear that the 
company had an urgent need of recapitalization. To get the capital needed, it is much 
easier for SdC to finance itself in Portugal, since the interest rates in the African 
countries are in general higher. However, the credit squeeze in Portugal made it difficult 
for SdC to finance itself and therefore go along with the initial plan.  
The new strategic plan suggests that the investments in the energy sector were 
only postponed. Nevertheless, according to António Castro Henriques SdC should not 
invest in the energy sector even in the future. The specialized players in the sector 
already have enormous advantages and new entrants will probably not be competitive 
enough (Fonseca, 2013a). Furthermore, it would require large initial investments and 
SdC is not in a healthy financial condition to do that. Even some construction 
companies larger than SdC are going back on their decisions regarding investments in 
the energy sector. For example, the FCC, a Spanish company, is selling its concession 
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and energy subsidiaries. Paulo Pinto Leal, President of the Executive Committee of 
SelfEnergy, has the same opinion, in the sense that SdC should concentrate in the 
current strategy, since it is not good for a company to change its strategy too often. He 
evaluates the situation as follows: when the investments in the energy sector were 
planed, the sector seemed to be a safe bet. However, the attractiveness changed 
dramatically with the difficulty in getting credit to capital-intensive sector with returns 
over 20 to 25 years, not to mention the financing difficulties the group was facing 
(Fonseca, 2013b).  
The sale of some specific assets would continue to be a priority and the 
reduction of operating costs became one of the mainstays to this update. This reduction 
would be in the fixed costs of the construction business, like reduction of manpower, 
costs with supplies and external services (Soares da Costa, 2011).   
All in all, this new strategic plan aims to cope with the difficult economic 
conditions and to attain a significant reduction in the indebtedness level. Therefore, SdC 
is planning to have an extremely international profile in 2015 (80% of the turnover) and 
to reach a net debt to EBITDA ratio of 5.6 also in 2015.  
Risks taken by SdC and the role of diversification 
	   As mentioned before, the construction sector faces a lot of distinctive risks, 
making this sector so unique. Nevertheless, it is also important to take into account the 
general risks involving all the business areas and the countries where the group 
operates. Firstly, there are the risks related to the business itself: operational risks – the 
ones that may affect the services or the clients’ satisfaction; integrity risks – related to 
the possible internal and external fraud; human resources risks – linked to management 
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issues, leadership, authority limits, and so on; and financial risks – associated with 
exchange rates, interest rates (financing risk), liquidity risk and credit risk.  
Secondly, the environmental risks that have to do with the competition, the political, 
economic and legal conditions, and new regulation or other type of change within the 
specific sector, which is the risk that most matters in this study (Soares da Costa, 
2010b).  
It is extremely important, as António Castro Henriques mentioned in the 
interview, to have a risk management department, as risk well managed can mean huge 
savings to companies. A risk management department may successfully plan ahead in 
order to ease the adverse effects of risk in a company’s profitability (Edwards, 1995). It 
identifies the risks, analyzes them and finds ways of managing them (for a better 
understanding of risk management department practices see figure A12).  
The risk resulting from the impact of business cycles affects any firm. One of 
the most known methods to dissipate this risk is diversification, but is it enough? 
Faghihi and Vahdat performed a study to investigate the diversification pattern in terms 
of new markets and respective performance of the largest international construction 
companies using the data published in Engineering News Record (ENR) top 225 
international contractors (2005-2010), in which SdC was a part of ranked as number 
103. The revenue listed in these top firms was the one earned abroad. The conclusion 
found was that, as the level of diversification increased, no relevant increase or decrease 
in the international revenue happened. In other words, a purely increase in 
diversification would not lead to higher international revenue (Faghihi & Vahdat, n.d.), 
meaning that diversification per se is not enough to boost international revenue. 
Before committing to any project of diversification, SdC should stabilize the 
level of indebtedness as in 2012 reached the maximum value, much higher than Mota-
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Engil and Teixeira Duarte (table 4). Nevertheless, SdC enterprise value has been 
increasing from 2006 until 2012, which meant an approximation in terms of enterprise 
value to both Teixeira Duarte and Mota-Engil (figure A13). Both Teixeira Duarte and 
Mota-Engil were already well diversified when it comes to investing in completely 
distinct sectors: 33% of Mota-Engil EBITDA came already from the environment sector 
(Mota-Engil, 2010), and regarding Teixeira Duarte only 59% of the turnover came from 
construction, the remaining came from sectors like energy, real estate, concessions, and 
so on. Moreover, 57% of the turnover was already non domestic (Teixeira Duarte, 
2010). Both companies’ strategies in 2010 were centered in internationalization and 
diversification and yet both companies suffered a mass decrease in the enterprise value, 
which did not happen to SdC (figure A13).  
A question arises then: Is it worthy for a construction company to diversify to 
other sectors? The evolution of SdC EBIT in each business sector is in table 6. Besides 
reflecting the business profitability before the effect of the capital structure and taxes, 
which is suitable, as it is more appropriate to see the performance of each area as if the 
company was financially healthy, EBIT is better to compare businesses in different 
industries as capital expenditures differ across them. From 2010 to 2012, the EBIT of 
construction has been decreasing, as well as its margin, and that can be explained by the 
crisis in the sector that makes it difficult to have projects to generate income, while the 
fixed costs and capital expenditures remain high. The total turnover also decreased from 
2011 to 2012. Despite the crisis, the concession and the real estate businesses were able 
to maintain a fairly positive EBIT margin contributing to an overall positive EBIT 
margin. In conclusion, if SdC had only relied on the construction business, the 
profitability and performance of the company would be even worse with negative EBIT 
levels for 2012. As the construction sector does not seem to be able to recovery to the 
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pre-crisis levels in the next few years (figure A14), SdC should definitely try to 
diversify more, paying attention to its already high debt level and the overall 
competencies needed, in order not to enter in industries in which SdC has no know-
how. Diversifying is not a risk-free strategy: it involves costs of entering into a new 
industry/market, the possible culture clash, and so on.  
Also, knowing the risks inherited to the activity and the uncertain future of 
Portugal, a series of questions arise: Why did SdC adopt such an ambitious strategic 
plan in 2010 (“Ambições Renovadas”) full of expansionist words and did not 
implement a more conservative plan to protect itself from the tough circumstances? In 
other words: why SdC was not able to predict the need for updating the strategic plan in 
a completely different direction? On the one hand, SdC could have predicted in 2010 
that the crisis would have consequences in Portugal, namely in the financial system, but 
on the other hand, the majority of these capital investments have been already made in 
2006/2007, almost simultaneously with the change in the shareholder structure and 
Fino’s entry in the group. It was then that SdC became the largest shareholder (33%) of 
Scutvias, bought CPE (Companhia Portuguesa de Parques de Estacionamento); and 
began the Auto Estrada Transmontana project, in which SdC had to mobilize 70 million 
euros of equity with a TIR of 9.5%. These investment decisions can only be justified 
with the long tail of expansionist environment that the sector had been experiencing. 
Nevertheless, this is only one more reason for SdC to implement a more conservative 
plan afterwards, rather than a strategic proposal with a great new number of investments 
and expansion. It is also the opinion of Pinto Leal that SdC should and could have been 
more cautious and conservative with the plan “Ambições Renovadas 2014”, as the signs 
were all there (Fonseca, 2013b).  
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Recommendations and prospects for the future 
Now that the risks have been stated, this part will focus on what SdC could do in 
the future to try to overcome this crisis, as well as to minimize the risk that comes from 
economic conditions through a strategy based on diversification. 
One significant thing is the fact that the construction, concession and even real 
estate businesses have comparable cycles, so as a strategy to diversify, perhaps 
investing in businesses that could underperform during the same periods is not the best 
choice, although understandable due to the easiness to enter in such industries with the 
construction business know-how. According to ACH, although the risks of construction 
and infrastructures business are not equal, they combine themselves in temporal cycles, 
so we end up with an amplification rather diversification of the risks. The correlation 
between both sectors is quite large. 
The betas of SdC, Teixeira Duarte and Mota-Engil, they are positive (table A8). 
Beta is a measure of risk/volatility compared to the overall market: having a positive 
beta means the stocks of these companies move in same direction of the market. The 
higher the beta, the higher the risk inherent to the stock, as they pay up exactly when the 
market is doing well. When the market underperforms they amplify the fall and 
negative evolution. What SdC could do is explore the possibility of having in its 
portfolio some participation in businesses with low (negative if possible) betas in order 
to forearm itself against the bad economic times. Broadly speaking, SdC should invest 
in business areas with low or negative beta to protect itself against future market 
downside risk.  
It is important, however, to bear in mind that this may not be an easy task, as 
SdC has no experience in investing in this kind of sectors. Moreover, attention had to be 
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paid in order to this investment not be translated into a loss of focus on the core 
business, but to take advantage somehow of the capabilities of the company.   
Chris Zook and James Allen, believe that companies that successfully sustained 
growth are the ones that expand their core business in related markets where they know 
they can thrive (Zook & Allen, 2003), for example still focusing on the core products, 
but selling them in new geographic regions. From what is disclosed to the public, SdC 
have been performing better in the African markets (which are experiencing economic 
growth) and that seems to be a good plan for SdC for the future, as long as SdC gives 
priority to projects that involve low equity investment, due to its high level of 
indebtedness. 
All in all, geographical diversification to emergent markets similar to Angola 
and Mozambique, in which SdC already exceled seems to be the best idea, as the 
company may rely on the competencies it already has. Lastly, a good approach to enter 
into a new country with less uncertainty and in a faster way, would be by acquiring an 
already existing company in that market and go from there, instead of bringing a new 
brand to an unknown market. That would imply some investment, so SdC could 
consider a merger, that would decrease the amount of initial investment, or a consortia 
with local firms. 
Conclusion 
 Even if the core business is underperforming and becomes very attractive to step 
in new booming markets with tempting margins and growth rates, the history of 
corporation changes tells that chances are more favorable if the company looks for 
change and diversification within its core sector (D. Edwards, 2012). As António Castro 
Henriques mentioned in the interview, SdC plans to drive down the risks by investing in 
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other countries with similar characteristics of Angola and Mozambique and in the 
construction sector, as it is an already known “territory” (Fonseca, 2013a).  
 The risks of the construction business are someway related to the ones of the 
concession, infrastructures and real estate business. As a matter of fact, the betas are 
positive, which means that the businesses tend to perform better when the market goes 
up and vise-versa. One way for SdC to diversify without amplifying the risks would be 
to invest in a sector with a low or negative correlation with the market. 
 Keith Cottam also debates the idea surrounding the concepts of ‘intrapreneur’: 
while an independent entrepreneur can simply develop a new product or idea using all 
its creativity, an ‘intrapreneur’ that comes up with a new idea is usually impeded to go 
along with it. All in all, the notion of entrepreneurship “does not fit well in the thinking 
of bureaucratic organizations” (Cottam, 1989), meaning an established company has 
always more difficulties in implementing entrepreneurial actions. Moreover, the 
situation gets worse in circumstances of economic crisis, as some minimum resources 
are needed to go along with new ideas. Additionally, SdC should have been more 
conservative in 2010, holding back new investments, as SdC had already invested a lot 
in 2006-2007. Now SdC needs to reduce the high indebtedness level in 2012 with a net 
debt to EBITDA ratio of 18.65, comparing with the levels of Teixeira Duarte (5.89) and 
Mota-Engil (3.24) (table 4 ), and then go along with some non capital intensive projects 
that could demand low initial investment. Maxim: assure high liquidity projects 
combined with low levels of capital resources. The financial situation ends up meaning 
that the room to take entrepreneurial actions is in fact significantly limited and reduced. 
Bottom line: until the financial situation of SdC is not under control, SdC should go for 
investments relying lightly on SdC’s capital, focusing on the core business in countries 
with similar characteristics as Angola and Mozambique. Then, SdC could investigate 
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the hypothesis of investing in segments that are not as correlated to the economic 
situation as the construction business. 
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Difficulty in hiring 
qualified staff 




2013 83,41 4,23 3,39 5,52 58,27 
2012 83,21 1,36 4,15 3,24 55,97 
2011 79,68 4,55 7,08 2,11 54,28 
2010 82,03 8,07 8,36 1,91 49,33 
2009 78,22 3,83 9,14 1,84 49,85 
2008 78,50 2,93 13,32 1,72 47,13 
2007 78,08 5,27 12,48 2,47 42,13 
 











Other No obstacle 
2013 34,56 54,46 12,87 24,20 11,62 
2012 37,38 53,25 14,02 27,28 9,83 
2011 39,14 52,95 16,73 26,88 15,41 
2010 24,15 40,85 18,61 28,37 18,68 
2009 19,78 40,69 19,92 34,83 25,58 
2008 35,30 19,25 24,72 34,13 30,48 
2007 24,05 9,25 23,05 32,47 30,82 
Table 2 – Employment in the construction sector, as a percentage of total employment 
(INE, 2013) 
% of total 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Employment in Construction 11,04 10,68 10,00 9,69 9,10 7,7 
Table 3 – Public Works Awarded and Public Works Promoted (annual rate of change %) 
– (Source: Banco de Portugal) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Public Works Awarded 24% 30% 12% -39% 
Public Works Promoted -7% 44% -29% 21% 
Table 4 – Net Debt to EBITDA ratio of SdC, Teixeira Duarte and Mota-Engil (Source: 
Bloomberg) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Soares da Costa 8,38 6,96 7,67 8,66 9,26 18,65 
Teixeira Duarte 15,23 11,36 10,74 9,18 10,20 5,89 
Mota-Engil 7,27 6,25 5,18 4,65 3,86 3,24 
Table 5 – Main construction indicators of SdC - Source: (Soares da Costa, 2010b) 
Million euros 2010 2009 VAR. 
Turnover 800 874,4 -8,5% 
 - Portugal 288,8 387,0 -25,4% 
 - External Market 511,2 487,5 4,9% 




2010 2011 2012 
EBIT Margin % EBIT Margin % EBIT Margin % 
Construction 32,3 3,80% 29,4 3,70% -8 -1,10% 
Concessions 19,9 19,50% 29 15,50% 26,5 16,90% 
Real Estate 3,9 26,60% 2,5 35,00% 2,8 12,80% 
Self Energy - - -2,2 -25,40% -2,7 - 
	  
